OCR may impose civil monetary penalties on both CEs and BAs for violations of any of the requirements of the Privacy or Security Rules.
Where more than one CE or BA is responsible for a violation each may be subject to CMPs. Organizations are liable for their employees’ and other agents’ acts “in accordance with the federal common law of agency.” This liability probably extends to BAs which are acting as agents.
For CMP purposes a “violation” is determined based on an “obligation to act or not act” under a regulatory provision, or in other words regulatory “requirements or prohibitions.” Where a given requirement or prohibition is repeated in both a general and a specific form in different provisions in the same subpart, only one violation is counted. Continuing violations, such as failure to have a BAC when required, are counted as a separate violation for each day they continue.
There are four penalty tiers of penalty, as follows:
These provisions are summarized in the following table.
Table 1 – Categories of Violations and Respective Penalty Amounts Available |
||
Violation Category |
Each violation |
All such violations of an identical provision in a calendar year |
(A) Did Not Know |
$100 – $50,000 | $1,500,000 |
(B) Reasonable Cause |
$1,000 – $50,000 |
$1,500,000 |
(C) Willful Neglect – Corrected |
$10,000 – $50,000 |
$1,500,000 |
(D) Willful Neglect – Corrected | $50,000 |
$1,500,000 |
Factors affecting the possible penalty amount for each violation include the following:
Civil penalties may not be imposed for an act which may be punishable under the HIPAA criminal penalty provisions, which the CE or BA has the burden of raising and proving as an affirmative defense. A CE or BA may also affirmatively defend itself by proving that a violation was “not due to willful neglect” and corrected either within 30 days of the first date on which the CE or BA ”knew, or by exercising reasonable diligence would have known, that the violation occurred,” subject to extension at DHHS discretion.
The following examples demonstrate how violations may be determined.
Example 1: Unauthorized access to PHI
Example 1 variation: Assume unauthorized access is discovered during log review as part of OCR investigation of unrelated complaint two years after event
Example 2: Defective business associate contract
Example 3: Negligent disposal of media
CMP Case Examples
The following are examples of OCR CMP actions:
Providence Health & Services. The first regulatory action to obtain a financial resolution for HIPAA violations occurred after the theft of computer hard drives storing unencrypted information about over two hundred thousand individuals. The health care provider gave public notice and notified DHHS and took mitigating and corrective actions. OCR and Providence entered into an agreement under which Providence undertook a corrective action plan and paid a $100,000 financial settlement (not a CMP).
Cignet Health. 41 patients of this four clinic health care provider filed complaints with OCR that Cignet would not grant them access to their records. Cignet ignored OCR’s investigative requests. OCR obtained a court order for production of the records, to which Cignet responded by producing records on some 4,500 patients, rather than the relevant 41. OCR imposed CMPs of $4.3 million, largely based on continuing violations for failing to provide individuals with record access and failing to cooperate with OCR.
CVS and Rite Aid. OCR and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) pursued joint (but separate) actions against these pharmacy chains for disposing of health care information in unsecured dumpsters. CVS settled for $2.25 million and Rite Aid for $1 million. It is not clear how the settlement amounts were determined.
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee. This health insurer experienced the theft of 57 hard drives containing unencrypted information on over one million individuals. It agreed to a corrective action plan and a settlement payment of $1.5 million.
Phoenix Cardiac. This small physician practice permitted its physicians to use unencrypted, standard commercial email and cloud-based online calendaring for communications and scheduling which included unencrypted PHI. OCR imposed a fine of $100,000 and a corrective action plan.
A CMP Hypothetical
An understanding of the potential severity of CMPs might be helped by review of a hypotheticals.
Assume the Oops! Clinic has decided to improve patient outreach (and perhaps patient care) by implementing an online portal through which patients can schedule appointments, provide information about their health status (e.g. glucometer readings for individuals with diabetes, blood pressure readings) and arrange to pay for care. From a patient care and administrative perspective this is probably a good thing.
The Oops! security official is also the clinic’s CIO, it’s been a few years since he’s reviewed HIPAA’s security requirements, and he’s under pressure to get the portal up and running. He therefore arranges to outsource the system to a third party, Inept BA LLC. Since it’s a technical contract and the CFO gripes about unnecessary legal expenses, the CIO figures he can handle it within his authority and Oops! enters into a standard services agreement with Inept BA. This standard agreement does not include the required elements for a BAC.
Inept BA and the CIO implement the portal and set it up so that patients can register online using their name and address as shown in the Oops! records. 500 patients choose to do so. For convenience, the system is set up so any of the 75 members of the Oops! staff can access information in any patient’s portal account. System logging is enabled but never reviewed as nobody really has the time. Secure socket layer encryption is implemented for online transmissions but stored data encryption is inconvenient and costs money and so is not implemented.
The system goes live on June 14, 2013. All appears to be going well. Then, in May 2016 the Oops! administrative systems are hacked, and the vulnerability is traced to the portal system. Because the hack affected patient financial data and other PHI, the CIO notifies the Oops! law firm, which advises him to notify OCR. He does so, and on June 14, 2012 OCR knocks on the door. The ensuing OCR investigation finds the following violations:
Requirement/Prohibition Violated
|
Number of Violations |
No risk analysis | Continuing for three years = 1,095 violations |
No Business Associate Contract | Continuing for three years = 1,095 violations |
No minimum necessary policies for staff use of portal information | Continuing for three years = 1,095 violations |
No staff training on secure portal use | Continuing for three years = 1,095 violations |
No authorization procedures for staff access | Per-staff member = 75 violations |
No workforce clearance procedures for staff access | Per-staff member = 75 violations |
No access control processes for staff access | Per-staff member = 75 violations |
No system log review | Continuing for three years? = 1,095 violations |
No encryption of portal data in storage | Continuing for three years = 1,095 violations |
Review of logs indicate ~9,000 events of staff access to portal information | ~9,000 minimum necessary violations |
~9,000 Privacy Rule “little security rule” violations | |
Patient registration does not provide for reliable authentication of patient users | Per-patient = 500 violations |
Review of logs indicate ~2,500 events of patient user access to portal | ~2,500 authentication violations |
~2,500 Privacy Rule “little security rule” violations |
The estimated total number of violations therefore exceeds 31,295, of 14 different requirements or prohibitions. Aggravating factors include the fact that some of the violations certainly created the vulnerability which led to the security breach, potentially causing patients financial harm, and that inadequate staff and patient access controls could have caused inaccurate data to be used for patient care.
In the ensuing proceedings, OCR took the position that the violations were attributable to willful neglect (third or fourth tier CMPs) by both Oops! and Inept BA. Oops! and Inept BA each blamed the other, and both tried to prove the violations were really due to reasonable cause (second tier).
At best, Oops! could wind up facing CMPs on the order of $7 million, while at worst CMPs could be at least $21 million. Inept BA will get off a little more lightly, as it was not responsible for Oops! security administrative and “little security rule” violations, but still faces millions in possible CMPs.
© 2013 John R. Christiansen